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More than two decades have passed since the start of the worldwide market-
oriented electricity sector reforms. The reforms have varied in terms of 
structure, market mechanisms, and regulation. However, the passage of time 
call for taking stock of the performance of the reforms in developing 
countries. This paper surveys the empirical literature on electricity sector 
reforms and draws some conclusions with a view to the future. Overall, the 
reforms have tended to improve the technical efficiency of the sector. The 
macroeconomic benefits of reforms are less clear and remain difficult to 
identify. Also, the gains from the reforms have often not trickled down to 
consumers because of institutional and regulatory weaknesses. In order to 
achieve lasting benefits, reforms need to adopt measures to align their pursuit 
of efficiency and economic with those of equity and provision of access. 
Reforms can deliver more economic benefits and alleviate poverty when the 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Since the early 1980s, and gathering pace in the 1990s, the network industries including the 
electricity sectors across the world have been subjected to restructuring and market-oriented 
reforms. By the end of the 1990s, the majority of OECD countries and over 70 developing 
and transition economies had taken some measures toward reforming their electricity sector 
(Bacon and Besant-Jones, 2001). The reforms aimed to replace the monopoly status of 
vertically integrated state-owned utilities and to allow private and foreign investors to take 
part in both the competitive and regulated part of the sector (Joskow, 1998; Newbery, 1999; 
Littlechild, 2000). The reforms remain work in progress in many developing countries 
offering the possibility to synthesize the lessons of experience to date. 
A generic reform of the electricity supply industry (ESI) involves high level measures such 
as: corporatisation of the entities, unbundling and restructuring of the sector, introducing 
competition in wholesale generation and supply activities, horizontal separation of 
incumbents to create viable competition, establishing independent regulatory authority, and 
privatization (Besant-Jones, 2006; Jamasb, 2006). These measures would allow vertical 
separation of the natural monopoly networks (transmission and distribution) from the 
potentially competitive segments (generation and supply). Vertical separation would prevent 
cross-subsidization between the competitive and regulated businesses and discriminatory 
practices such as denial of third-party access to networks (Joskow, 2003). The degree of 
vertical separation varied and took the forms of functional, accounting, legal, or ownership 
separation. Low level reform measures include cost-reflective pricing (e.g., removal or 
restructuring of subsidies, tariff liberalisation and cost-reflective price setting), adoption of 
new technologies, new financial schemes and community involvement (Prasad, 2008). 
In developing countries, the high and low level reforms were implemented against the 
backdrop of chronic electricity shortages, weak institutions, under-capitalisation, poor 
operating equipment, high system losses (and electricity theft), complex political economy 
settings and the inability to extend access to all the poor. The reforms were expected to 
enhance efficiency, improve quality of service, reduce the price-cost gap through cost-
reflective pricing and increase investments (Newbery, 2002; Kessides, 2012). Reforms would 
also benefit the poor by improving access to electricity thereby enhancing other services such 
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as healthcare, education and communications, cost efficiency, and stimulation of economic 
development and welfare (Davies et al., 2003). 
A key question is the extent to which these goals have been achieved in practice considering 
that ample resources have been invested in the reforms in nearly three decades. Answering 
this question requires revisiting the theoretical rationale and examining the empirical 
evidence of progress and performance of the reforms against their objectives. However, 
comprehensive analyses of the effects of the reforms on the sector and the economy (e.g., 
electricity pricing, quality of supply, utility performance, economic growth, social welfare 
and poverty reduction) are limited in the literature. 
On the other hand, there has been a renewed interest in the relationship between electricity 
sector reforms, reliability and quality of service, economic growth, welfare, and the 
environment, particularly climate change concerns (Nepal and Jamasb, 2015). For example, 
the UK, a pioneer of market-based reforms, proposed a new electricity market reform in 2010 
signalling the desire for more government intervention to meet its sustainability objectives 
(Pollitt, 2012). In Latin America, countries such as Bolivia, Venezuela and the Dominican 
Republic some assets have been renationalized indicating a return to an active role for the 
state in the sector (Balza et al., 2013). Argentina, once at the forefront of marked oriented 
reform, has also diminished the role of markets in the energy sector (Littlechild, 2013). 
Nearly 30 years since the first electricity sector reform in Chile, this paper takes stock of the 
cumulative experience with this important experiment in developing countries. The reforms 
have proven more difficult than first anticipated and most remain work in progress. This 
paper attempts to reduce the research gaps in the electricity reform literature by reviewing the 
progress and the outcomes. In an earlier study, Jamasb et al. (2005) reviewed the evidence 
from reforms in developing countries focussing on the operating efficiency and access. This 
paper differs in focus and aims to revisit and reflect on the reform experience as many 
developing countries are undergoing a period of introspection after more than quarter of a 
century of reforms. Electricity reform in developing countries is at a stage where a review is 
necessary considering the inconclusive verdict on the effectiveness of reforms purveyed by 
the existing literature.
1
 
We consider both empirical and theoretical literature on the linkages between electricity 
reforms; economic and technical efficiency, economic growth, welfare and poverty reduction 
                                                          
1
 We thank a reviewer for this point. 
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in developing countries. The paper aims to highlight reform performance, explore the link 
between the theory and practice of electricity reforms and thus fill an important gap in the 
literature. We do not examine the impact of reforms on the environment. It suffices to state 
that reforms may or may not have negative environmental impacts as this is rather a matter of 
devising effective environmental policies.
2
 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides an overview on the 
drives, context and status of electricity reforms around the world. Section 3 discusses the 
different methodological approaches to studying the impacts of reforms and analyse the 
impacts of energy sector reforms on several industry specific and macroeconomic 
dimensions. Section 4 synthesizes the insights from the reforms and policy lessons while 
critically reflecting on the development of the reforms. Section 5 concludes the paper. 
 
2. ELECTRICITY REFORMS: CONTEXT, DRIVERS, AND STATUS 
 
Adopting market-oriented electricity sector reforms based on the ‘textbook or standard 
model’ became a world-wide trend during the 1990s. The textbook model was first applied in 
the Chile in 1982 and inspired reforms in other countries. The standard model involved the 
following steps and sequence: i) corporatization of state-owned enterprises and creating state-
owned corporations, ii) enacting legislation for sector liberalization, iii) establishment of an 
independent regulator, iv) unbundling (vertical separation) of the main functions, v) incentive 
regulation of the networks, vi) establishment of wholesale and retail electricity markets, vii) 
privatization through sale of assets from the state to the private sector
3
 and introduction of 
private independent power producers (IPPs). The model represented a paradigm shift in terms 
of electricity sector structure, the role of the state, and the regulation of the sector (Joskow, 
1998; Newbery, 1999; Joskow, 2008). 
Market structure exerts strong influence on whether and the extent to which reforms can 
improve the efficiency and performance of the sector. Creating a market-based structure 
                                                          
2
 A notable study by ESMAP (2011) shows that vertical unbundling tends to reduce carbon dioxide emissions 
by 5% indicating a higher degree of environmental sustainability. 
3
 Corporatization involves reorganizing the structure of the government-owned entity into a legal entity with a 
corporate structure still allowing the government to retain ownership of the company while privatization is the 
transfer of government-owned assets and rights into private hands. Corporatization is normally a precursor to 
partial or full privatization in many cases. 
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required ownership unbundling and workable competition in the generation and supply 
functions (Newbery, 2005). Competition inevitably meant a reduction in state ownership, as 
new private actors could participate in wholesale markets and erode market shares of the 
incumbents (Pollitt, 2012). The reforms aimed at expanding the scope for competition in the 
sector through ‘competition in the market’ or ‘competition for the market’. As a result, there 
was a strong drive for privatisation and new models of private sector participation such as 
Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) in the sector (Ljung, 2007; Vagliasindi, 2013). 
The reforms also revealed the need to create strong and effective new institutions in the form 
of independent regulatory agencies. The separation of the natural monopoly networks from 
the competitive segments and privatisation placed much emphasis on economic regulation to 
ensure that public interests were reflected in terms of service quality, network access and 
tariffs while the generators had equal access to the grid and consumers. Incentive regulation 
of networks was a practical approach where competitive markets could not exist (Vogelsang, 
2002). The perverse incentives created by cost-of-service regulation in the form of gold-
plated assets (Averch and Johnson, 1962) implied that incentive regulation could be adopted 
to improve cost efficiency of the transmission and distribution networks.  
Table 1 contrasts the drivers of electricity reforms in developed and developing countries. 
The motives for reforms differed in developing and developed countries while external 
drivers played a key role in shaping the reforms. Poor operational and financial performance 
of state owned utilities; technological progress and development of the efficient combined 
cycle gas turbines (CCGTs); political faith in the markets, competition and privatization; 
pressure from international donor organisations; proceeds from asset divestiture and reducing 
Public Sector Borrowing Requirement (PSBR) were among the drivers of the reforms.
4
 The 
pre-reform sectors in developing countries were primarily characterised by: i) poor 
performance of the state-run utilities in terms of high costs; ii) inadequate expansion of 
                                                          
4 For example, the World Bank changed its lending policy in 1992 followed later by the Asian Development 
Bank (ADB); the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) and the Inter-American 
Development Bank (IADB) for electricity development from the traditional project lending to policy lending. 
Almost $US 187 billion of private capital flowed into the economies of 76 developing countries during the 
1990s (Beder, 2005). In the UK, privatization of state-owned energy utilities reflected the ideology of the 
government and its interest in reducing the cost of domestic coal subsidies and strong economic and political 
motives also existed in Chile, Norway and New Zealand (Newbery, 2002; Hogan, 2002). Technological 
progress lowered the significant barriers to entry and competition that existed in power generation. Likewise, 
Bolivia including other Latin American countries (LACs), Ghana and the transition economies (which include 
the countries in the former Soviet Union) are examples of energy sector privatization in the context of debt 
crisis. Interestingly, privatisation in the LACs contributed to about 40% of the total value of energy 
privatizations in the world during the 1990s (Gabriele, 2004). 
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access to service for the population, coupled with unreliable supply; iii) the inability of the 
public sector to finance the needed spending on new and maintenance investments; iv) the 
need to remove subsidies in order to release resources for other essential public spending 
needs and v) the need to raise revenue for cash-strapped governments through the sale of 
assets (Bacon, 1995; Bacon and Besant-Jones, 2001; Joskow, 2008). 
 
Table 1: Drivers of Electricity Sector Reforms 
Electricity sector drivers External drivers 
 
Developed countries:  
Excess capacity, use of costly generation 
technologies, economic inefficiency, and growing 
consumer demand for cheap energy. 
 
Developing countries: 
Lack of public sector financial resources to meet 
growing demand, institutional inefficiency, burden 
of energy subsidies, low service quality, high 
energy losses, poor service coverage, capacity 
shortage and energy sector investment constraints.   
 
a) Political and economic ideology: Based on 
the forces of market, competition and 
privatization. 
b) Technological innovation: Such as the 
development of CCGTs. 
c) Macroeconomic events: Such as the post-
Soviet economic transition (1989), Latin 
American debt crisis (1980s), Asian financial 
crisis (1997-1998). 
d) Capital raising options: Privatization of state 
owned energy assets. 
e) OECD energy deregulation: Creation of new 
energy multinationals looking for new 
investment opportunities. 
f) Lending policies of donors: Such as those of 
the World Bank and IMF with strings 
attached. 
g) National economic reform context: As a 
result of economic crisis and structural 
adjustment programs. 
 
 
The initial conditions such as resource endowment, initial structure, size, and institutional 
strength of the electricity sectors as well as the design, scope, and implementation of reforms 
varied across countries. These factors inevitably came to play an important role in adoption 
and performance of the reforms influencing the design and pace of reforms (World Bank, 
2004). The initial sector structure defines the starting point of the reform process and is 
important for envisaging an appropriate structure from the start of the reform process and 
realising the benefits of reform, which may be substantial (Hogan, 2002). The institutional 
factors refer to the sector and economy level legal and regulatory framework that influence 
and support continuity of the reform process. The reforms and regulation of the sector in 
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developing countries tend to suffer from weak institutional environment in terms of limited 
regulatory capacity, limited accountability, limited commitment and limited fiscal efficiency 
(Laffont, 2005). A weak institutional environment can render the reforms and regulation of 
the sector ineffective. Hence, effective regulation remains a challenge in developing countries 
considering that regulators struggle to determine whether and how to introduce competition 
in the network industries (Armstrong and Sappington, 2006). 
Regulation (predominantly cost-based) can also be prone to political capture and becoming a 
tool of self-interest for the government or the elite in developing countries (Stiglitz, 1998). 
However, regulation by contract or in combination with regulatory independence can provide 
a better regulatory framework for developing countries aiming to privatize their systems 
(Bakovic et al., 2003). The size of the sector can influence the reform capabilities and options 
of the reforming countries. It is not clear if small electricity systems in developing countries 
require or benefit from vertical separation and third-party access. For example, the scope for 
competition may be limited implying that, in small systems; the benefits of liberalization may 
be small in relation to the costs (Kessides, 2004). 
Despite these notable differences, the reforms have been pursued across the world under 
varying initial conditions. Some have had relative success while many have not lived up to 
ambitions and expectations after more than two decades of reforms. For example, market 
driven reforms in OECD countries such as Chile, Norway have performed well as in the UK, 
often considered as a successful model of electricity reforms (Joskow, 1997; Newbery and 
Pollitt, 1997; Jamasb and Pollitt, 2005).
5
 In contrast, the inability to attract private 
investments in Sub-Saharan African countries such as Uganda and Zambia remains a 
disappointment. According to the World Bank’s Private Participation in Infrastructure 
database, there was a boom in IPPs during the 1990s, which subsequently abated with the 
arrival of the financial crisis in the late 1990s. 
 
Reforms seem to have failed to correct the chronic underinvestment in electricity supply in 
most developing and transition countries, which accounts for much of the poor performance 
of the sector in these countries. For example, there was little investment in the sector from 
1991 to at least the mid-2000s except for the Russian Federation and Turkey in the European 
and Central Asian countries (Barbara, 2010). Some countries (e.g. in Latin America) have 
                                                          
5
 Examining the empirical literature and evidence on the impacts of reforms in developed countries is outside 
the scope of the present paper. 
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made relatively advanced transition to market-based energy sectors while others (e.g., China, 
Russia, South Africa) are caught between the state and the market where the state still plays a 
dominant role in operation and management of the sector. Table 2 summarizes the electricity 
reform experience in a matrix for selected cases. 
 
Table 2: Reform Status of Electricity Sector in Selected Countries  
Country 
Primary factors 
for reform 
Milestones of  
reform process 
Main outcomes 
Limitation/ 
challenges 
Brazil 
Poor performance 
of state-owned 
utilities, 
demonstrations 
effects from Chile 
and Argentina.  
Launched radical 
reforms in 1996, 
privatisation began in 
1995, creation of 
independent regulators 
in 1998, short term 
wholesale market 
created between 1995 
and 2003, long term 
contracts model 
replaced the previous 
wholesale market 
between 2004 and 
2005. 
Increasing reversal to 
central planning, 
competition has improved 
in the sector, auction 
process in transmission 
provide competition and 
incentives for investors, 
and distribution 
companies procure 
electricity at competitive 
price. 
Excessive reliance on 
hydropower can lead 
to energy crisis in the 
face of rising 
demand as in 2001-
2002, de-
carbonisation a 
challenge when 
addressing security 
of supply and fuel 
diversity in 
generation, attracting 
private investments a 
necessary condition 
for the growth of the 
sector. 
China 
Electricity reforms 
pursued as a part 
of wider liberal 
economic reforms. 
Corporatisation and 
commercialisation of 
sector in 1998, 1999 
bidding by power 
generators, separation 
of generation from 
transmission and 
distribution in 2002, 
creation of state 
electricity regulatory 
commission in 2002, 
scheme for power price 
reform in 2003. 
Overall reforms 
postponed, industry 
restructuring not 
accompanied by the 
introduction of 
competitive markets, 
entrenched interests have 
obstructed further reform, 
generating capacity 
doubled between 2002 
and 2007. 
Future of power 
sector reform 
uncertain, political 
environment will be 
important in moving 
forward with stalled 
reforms, institutions 
such as legal system 
and capital markets 
remain immature to 
support competitive 
markets. 
Fiji 
Fiscal problems, 
donors lending 
policy. 
1996 Public Enterprise 
Act, functional 
separation in 1998, 
internal reform again 
started in 2002, tariffs 
increase by 
independent regulator 
in 2005.  
Productivity 
improvements, system 
losses reduced from 18% 
to 10%, tariff collection 
rates increased, more 
authority and discretion to 
independent regulators. 
Regulator unable to 
make independent 
decisions on tariff 
setting, unstable 
political environment 
can lead to low 
private sector 
involvement. 
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Ghana 
Supply shortages, 
external lending 
policy, fiscal 
crisis, lack of 
investment, poorly 
performing 
distribution sector. 
World Bank requires 
reform as loan 
conditions in 1994, 
1997 restructuring and 
privatization plan, 
regulator formed, IPPs 
introduced in 1998, 
reforms shelved by 
parliament in 2001, 
Volta River Authority 
(VRA) unbundled in 
2008. 
Reforms stalled, structure 
of the sector has not 
changed much, VRA 
mostly operating under 
financial losses, 
distribution losses remain 
high, tariff setting not 
economic and eroding the 
long term viability of 
utilities. 
Regulator not 
independent from 
political interference, 
no standard form of 
PPA in the market, 
competing pressures 
to keep consumer 
tariffs low hampering 
the establishment of 
cost-reflective tariff. 
India 
Economic 
openness to 
foreign 
investment, poor 
performance of 
state-owned 
electric utilities. 
IPP entry in 1991, 
introduction of 
independent regulation 
act (at state level) was 
passed in 1998, 
Electricity Reform Act 
enacted in 2003. 
All states (29) have 
constituted independent 
regulators while 23 states 
have undertaken tariff 
reform, 20 states have 
implemented 
unbundling/corporatizatio
n, 2 states (Orissa and 
Delhi) have privatised 
distribution, 28 states have 
implemented third party 
access and 11 states have 
exercised multi-year 
distribution tariff orders. 
Success of reform 
not encouraging, 
questionable 
outcomes based on 
competition and 
privatisation, 
technical losses 
above 35% of power 
generation, power 
theft on-going, state-
level corruption, and 
subsidised tariffs. 
Russia 
Electricity reforms 
pursued as a part 
of wider liberal 
economic reforms 
after Soviet-Union 
break up. 
Establishment of joint 
stock company for 
electricity in 1992, 
reform principles 
adopted in 2001, 
regulatory framework 
established in 2003, 
gradual transition 
towards market pricing 
in 2003, privatisation 
of quasi- monopolist in 
2008, free market 
pricing in theory in 
2011. 
Reforms stalled, lack of 
insufficient investments 
for system modernization 
and low carbon generation 
capacity, electricity 
pricing controlled by 
government for social 
equity concerns. 
Blackouts in 2002 
highlighted fragility 
of the system, 
destruction of a 
hydropower plant in 
2008 highlighted the 
need for system 
modernisation, 
market pricing only 
in theory as 
government actively 
monitors electricity 
prices. 
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South 
Africa 
Democratic 
revolution of 
1994, poor 
performance of 
state-owned 
utilities, new 
international 
thinking. 
Creation of an 
independent regulator 
in 1995, White Paper 
on Energy Policy 
published in 1998, 
announcement of no 
unbundling of the 
incumbent in 2004, 
White Paper on 
renewable energy 
published in 2003. 
Overall reluctance to 
reform, post 1990 
performance saw some 
improvements in quality 
and security of supply, 
rapid progress in 
extending electricity 
access, prices still low by 
international standards 
and below cost-recovery 
levels. 
Urgent need for 
capacity expansion 
as capacity is tight, 
pricing principles of 
efficiency and cost-
reflectivity 
necessary, 
transparency in 
subsidy programme 
needed. 
Thailand 
Supply shortages, 
government’s 
massive debt, and 
Asian financial 
crisis. 
1992 Electricity Law, 
IPP Law 1996, 
approval of 
independent regulator 
establishment in 1999, 
abandonment of price 
based pool in 2003, 
privatisation 
postponement in 2004, 
and establishment of 
energy regulatory 
board in 2008. 
Electricity market reforms 
remain inactive, 
uneconomic tariff 
structure which is 
disadvantageous to 
consumers, regulation ad 
incentive schemes do not 
promote efficiency but 
favour the state 
enterprises. 
Political turmoil 
affecting reform 
implementation, 
regulatory 
institutions remain 
weak and not 
independent, state 
enterprises are 
favoured, promoting 
market competition 
difficult. 
 
The single-buyer model dominates most of the electricity sectors in Asia, Africa and some 
transition countries as observed in Table 3. The single buyer model is perceived to be a 
reasonable second-best solution in countries where the competitive model would not work 
(Arizu et al., 2006). In contrast, some countries in Latin America have competitive wholesale 
arrangements and considerable reforms have been carried out with adherence to the standard 
reform model. The generation segment has undergone privatization in many developing 
countries while the networks remain publicly owned. The privatisation of the ESI has been 
largely pursued in Latin America while IPPs now occupy a large market in Asia, particularly 
in China, Indonesia, the Philippines, India, Pakistan, Malaysia and Thailand under a single-
buyer model. Overall, many developing countries are still some distance away from the full 
adoption of the liberalized standard model and are by and large still in transition from state 
control to markets. 
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Table 3: Power Sector Reform Matrix 
Market structure 
Private ownership and 
involvement 
Regulation 
China, Thailand, 
Vietnam, Nepal, Sri 
Lanka,  Burkina Faso, 
Nigeria, Côte d’Ivoire, 
Zimbabwe, Senegal, 
Morocco, Tunisia 
M
o
n
o
li
th
ic
 s
in
g
le
 b
u
ye
r 
China, Malaysia, 
Philippines, Thailand, 
Vietnam, Nepal, 
Lithuania, Turkey, 
Russia, Nicaragua, 
Colombia, Bolivia, 
Argentina, Brazil, Peru, 
Chile, Tunisia, Morocco, 
Kenya, Zimbabwe, Côte 
d’Ivoire, Uganda, 
Nigeria, Ghana, 
Cameroon, Bangladesh, 
Sri Lanka, India, 
Pakistan 
G
en
er
a
ti
o
n
 
Malaysia, Philippines, 
Thailand, Pakistan, 
Bangladesh, Nepal 
Cameroon, Nigeria, 
Uganda, Côte d’Ivoire, 
Senegal, Kenya, 
Argentina, Bolivia, 
Chile, Peru, Brazil, 
Nicaragua, Colombia, 
Russia, Turkey, 
Azerbaijan, Kyrgyzstan I
n
d
ep
en
d
en
t 
re
g
u
la
to
rs
  
ex
is
ts
 
Malaysia, Philippines, 
Pakistan, Bangladesh, 
Ghana, Uganda, 
Kenya, Turkey, 
Lithuania 
U
n
b
u
n
d
le
d
 s
in
g
le
 
b
u
ye
r 
Cameroon, Côte 
d’Ivoire, Argentina, 
Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, 
Peru, Nicaragua, 
Colombia, Russia, 
Lithuania T
tr
a
n
sm
is
si
o
n
 
Korea Rep., 
Cameroon, 
Uzbekistan, 
Turkmenistan, 
Tajikistan, Azerbaijan, 
Kyrgyzstan 
M
o
n
o
p
o
ly
 
Philippines, Pakistan, 
Cameroon, Uganda, Côte 
d’Ivoire, Morocco, Chile, 
Brazil, Peru, Argentina, 
Bolivia, Nicaragua, 
Colombia, Russia, 
Lithuania, Turkey, 
Azerbaijan 
D
is
tr
ib
u
ti
o
n
 
Argentina, Bolivia, 
Brazil, Chile, 
Colombia, Peru, 
Nicaragua, Russia W
h
o
le
sa
le
 
co
m
p
et
it
io
n
 
Source: Ljung (2007) and authors' compilation 
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3. ASSESSING THE IMPACTS OF REFORMS 
 
Several approaches have been used in the literature to assess the impacts of energy sector 
reforms, particularly in the electricity sector. These include social cost-benefit analysis, 
econometric analysis, efficiency and productivity analysis, macroeconomic analysis and 
specific case studies (Joskow, 2006; Pollitt, 2012). A social cost-benefit analysis (SCBA), in 
principle, considers the reforms as an investment and compares the costs and benefits in 
terms of the changes in actual and projected performance relative to a counterfactual of what 
would have happened in the absence of reforms (Jones et al., 1990). A SCBA can assess the 
overall welfare impact of reforms and the distribution of welfare. However, governments do 
not necessarily perform a SCBA and instead tend to rely on less formal assessments (Jamasb 
et al., 2005). Moreover, electricity reforms are multi-dimensional activities with many 
interacting factors, which cannot be captured by a SCBA but influence the social worth of a 
policy. The assumption that aggregate social welfare can be expressed, as an aggregation of 
individual social welfare is also problematic coupled with the empirical problems in 
quantifying the costs and benefits of a policy. 
Econometric analysis is applied to test hypotheses through statistical analysis on the 
determinants and performance of reforms and thereby quantifying the effect of reforms on 
performance indicators. Performance metric regressions based on cross-section, panel data 
econometrics and time-series econometrics can serve this purpose. Statistical tests to assess 
the significant differences in the performance metrics before and after reforms are often 
carried out using a t-test on time-series data. However, a t-test cannot control for the effects 
of other variables as in a multivariable regression analysis. Cross-country econometric 
analysis is also complicated by model specification challenges due to the multi-faceted nature 
of the reforms and the diverse characteristics of the electricity sectors across countries. The 
absence of adequate data and the associated measurement problems pose a problem for 
assessment of reform impacts. 
Efficiency and productivity analyses are desirable for assessing the effectiveness to transform 
inputs into outputs, relative to best practice. Parametric and non-parametric methods are both 
used in measuring productivity and efficiency. Parametric methods such as stochastic frontier 
analysis (SFA) use productions or cost functions and in econometric techniques. In contrary, 
non-parametric methods use mathematical programming techniques and do not require 
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specification of functional forms. Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) is a commonly used 
non-parametric method that evaluates the performance of an agent relative to the frontier 
(Coelli et al. 2005). Frontier methodologies measure efficiency as the distance to the frontier 
by constructing a cost or production function such that each individual agent is benchmarked 
against the best practice, also known as benchmarking. Efficiency and productivity analysis 
can reduce the need for large datasets and especially when the data is difficult to collect. 
However, a shortcoming of the SFA is that it cannot adequately handle multiple outputs 
while multiple-output distance functions can suffer from input-output separability. On the 
other hand, DEA may systematically underestimate the inefficiency in small samples if the 
general assumptions on production and distribution are too weak. 
Macroeconomic analysis use models, such as computable general equilibrium (CGE) to 
quantify the impact of reforms on the economy. The CGE models use actual economic data to 
estimate how the economy might respond to changes in policy, technology or other external 
factors pertaining to energy reforms. The advantage of the CGE modelling is that they 
attempt to model the interaction effects of sector reform with non-reforming sectors and 
calculate the aggregate welfare effect directly. However, they can be too aggregate with the 
results, failing to shed light on the relevant sectors or issues. They also imply data 
requirements, which are hard for many developing countries to meet. The results from the 
CGE analysis can be debatable given their reliance on stronger assumptions than empirical 
economists tend to view as being consistent with data; for example, nested constant elasticity 
of substitution (CES) functional forms for production functions.
6 
Single or multi-country case studies are desirable when in-depth investigation or qualitative 
analysis is needed. These studies are useful when qualitative aspects of reforms such as 
regulation and conflict resolution and reform dynamics such as the implementation process 
are crucial in assessing the efficacy of the reforms (Jamasb et al., 2005). This is because these 
factors are inherently difficult to capture through statistical methods. Case studies can 
examine issues that do not easily lend themselves to rigorous quantitative analysis or could 
not be analysed due to a lack of data. Hence, case studies can overcome the issues associated 
with model specification and accuracy of variables in representing the relevant aspect of 
reform. Case studies involving single or multiple countries are popular for studying the 
process and outcomes of electricity reforms in developing countries where institutions differ 
across countries. 
                                                          
6
 We thank a referee for providing this information. 
14 
 
The above approaches provide useful insights into the effects of reforms on performance 
indicators (Joskow, 2006). However, it is important to adopt a comparative governance 
approach (Williamson, 1985) to the evaluation of the performance of alternative institutional 
arrangements. The comparative governance approach involves comparing the observed 
performance with performance under a defined set of institutional arrangements considering 
that ‘ideal’ textbook performance based on the virtues of perfectly competitive markets 
cannot be achieved in reality. Hence, one of the challenges of the ‘before and after’ 
assessment of reform performance is the need for developing a suitable counterfactual 
benchmark for comparison purposes which is difficult to establish. 
 
3.1. Microeconomic Impacts of Reforms 
This section reviews the relevant literature analyzing the impacts of reforms on several 
dimensions pertaining to the microeconomics of the electricity sector including pricing, 
economic efficiency and service quality (e.g., reliability). As market-driven reforms rely on 
competition and price signals, reforms are expected to lower electricity costs and retail prices 
and prevent the exercise and abuse of market power while improving the overall efficiency of 
the sector (Joskow, 1998).
7
 However, “the cure for market power can be worse than the 
disease itself” as, noted in Joskow (2006). Mitigating the exercise of market power ex-post 
has been a major challenge faced by many sector regulators (Newbery, 1997). 
It is noteworthy that, prior to the reforms, in developing countries under-pricing of electricity 
was common and a driving factor for the deterioration of the performance of the sector due to 
underinvestment. Another notable characteristic was that electricity prices often represented 
cross-subsidization from industrial customers to households. The rationale for these pricing 
policies is that they fostered desirable social goals such as helping poorer customers who 
would otherwise be disadvantaged although the richer groups of the society tend to benefit 
more from these subsidies (Kessides, 2012). Hence, market based pricing and removal of 
subsidies, a source of inefficiency, is expected to result in increased prices to cost-reflective 
levels. On the other hand, in the event of market power, prices are expected to fall to cost-
reflective levels due to the virtues of competitive forces. 
                                                          
7
Market power in electricity generation is understood as the ability of a generator to deviate the price from the 
competitive levels in ‘a profitable way’ for a continued period of time. Vertical market power may occur when a 
single generator controls more than one aspect of electricity production while horizontal market power results 
due to the concentration of ownership. 
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3.1.1. Impacts of reforms on electricity pricing 
Cost-reflective electricity prices imply that prices are set at an efficient level. It is expected to 
incentivize necessary investments through private sector and foreign investments. It provides 
incentive to reduce costs, increase efficiency and induces innovation to increase profits 
(Newbery, 1995). Market driven reforms are expected to establish cost-reflective pricing by 
harnessing competition and leading to improved efficiency and lower prices. Reforms would 
encourage entry of new actors by providing better incentives so that new and efficient 
entrants and technologies would create downward pressure on prices (Fan, 2007). Hence, 
reforms are expected to lead to lower price-cost margins and cost-reflective pricing where 
prices move towards their long-run marginal costs (LRMC). However, in many developing 
countries, regulated prices were inefficiently low and liberalization would mean raising the 
prices towards cost-reflective levels and provide better investment incentives. 
However, there is no consensus regarding the price impact of reforms. Evidence suggests that 
privatisation did not lower the costs in the short run as government interference with 
investment decisions led to increased costs (Pollitt, 1995). Moreover, the evidence of pricing 
impacts of reforms varies across jurisdictions which undertook the reforms. Three studies by 
Nagayama (2007; 2009) and Erdogdu (2011) are of notable for assessing the worldwide 
effect of reforms on prices. Nagayama (2007) shows that the introduction of foreign IPPs, 
privatization and introducing retail competition lowered prices in some jurisdictions though 
not across all jurisdictions undertook reforms. Regulatory institutions in developing countries 
are often not sufficiently independent implying that political interference can prevent prices 
from being cost-reflective. Country level corruption on contracts granted to the IPPs also 
prevented the reforms from producing their intended effects in developing countries such as 
in Southeast Asia (Henisz and Zelner, 2002). On the other hand, ESMAP (2011) shows that 
vertical unbundling in developing countries decreased electricity tariffs by 10% indicating a 
higher degree of competitiveness. 
Nagayama (2009) shows that progress in liberalization led to declining cross-subsidies across 
the electricity sectors in Asian developing countries. Electricity prices rose in these countries 
in the aftermath of reforms. In Latin America, the impact of liberalization on prices is mixed. 
The wholesale and retail prices have often risen due to unbundling and privatization in order 
to assure return in investment expected by private investors. 
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The effects of reforms on the price cost-margin (i.e. the difference between electricity price 
and cost) and cross subsidies can be different between industrial and residential consumers 
although there are limited studies of these. Erdogdu (2011) showed that participation of IPPs 
in the generation market and the existence of wholesale markets seem to decrease the 
industrial price-cost margin in Latin American countries. The study found that the 
establishment of wholesale electricity markets and regulators had a downward effect on the 
residential price-cost margins in developing countries while unbundling, with privatization, 
also had a decreasing effect on residential price-cost margins in Latin America. Hence, the 
overall impacts of reforms on electricity prices seem to also depend on the level of industry 
restructuring. 
The impact of reforms on electricity prices has been less frequently studied on a regional 
basis and the focus of most research has been at the utility level. India provides an interesting 
case to assess the differences in regional outcomes of reforms considering that its different 
states share a common economic and political system. Sen and Jamasb (2012) analyze the 
impacts of individual reform measures on key economic and sector variables for different 
Indian states and showed that average prices were unaffected by reforms. Meanwhile passing 
of tariff order in different states as a mechanism to correct price distortions significantly 
lowered the industrial prices. Tariff order also rationalized electricity pricing by lowering the 
cross-subsidies between industrial and residential customers, while unbundling lowered the 
cross-subsidies between the industrial and agricultural customers. In Orissa, average 
electricity tariffs increased from 1991 to 2001 (Kundu and Mishra, 2011). The price of 
electricity increased sharply particularly for agricultural customers after the reforms due to 
the abolishment of government subsidies. 
In Latin America, the change in the regulatory regime from cost-based to price-caps did not 
produce a clear pattern of price development although the changes in ownership and 
regulatory regime in the distribution segment led to a decline in retail prices in general 
(Estache and Rossi, 2005). The price fall, however, did not match the productivity gains. 
However, Balza et al. (2013) estimated that an increase in cumulative private investment by 
1% led to a 0.015% reduction in electricity prices across some countries Latin America. The 
quality of regulation in reforming countries is sensitive to pricing impacts of sector reforms. 
In Peru, for example, the restructuring and privatization of the distribution utilities led to 
price increases (Anaya, 2010). In Argentina, wholesale electricity prices as well as the real 
average tariffs fell from the 1992 levels as a result of increased competition due to industry 
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restructuring and privatization even though the prices froze in the wake of an economic crisis 
in 2002 due to the devaluation of the national currency (Haselip and Potter, 2010). Average 
node prices for electricity declined in Chile from the 1982 levels with the implementation of 
reforms while prices decline by 30% in Argentina (Pollitt, 2004). In Colombia, prices fell by 
20% (Ayala and Millan, 2003). Nonetheless, assessing the causal effect of the price fall for 
low-income groups is complicated in Chile as targeted subsidies and electrification policies 
can also produce the effect rather than strictly privatization (Paredes, 2001). 
In other developing countries, the impact of reforms on electricity prices are opposite of that 
in Latin America. For example, in Turkey privatization of the distribution utilities did not 
yield the expected retail price declines in the initial years although wholesale tariffs exhibited 
a reduction (retail price increased by 6% while wholesale price decreased by 10% (Karahan 
and Toptas, 2013). In Sub-Saharan Africa, prices have been generally high as compared to 
the rest of the world irrespective of electricity reforms.
8
 Reforms also had no impact on prices 
in South Asian countries such as Bangladesh and Pakistan where prices were not cost-
reflective and politically determined (Bhattacharya, 2007). 
Electricity prices continue to be below the cost recovery levels giving rise to high commercial 
losses among the transition countries such as Georgia, Moldova, Ukraine and the 
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) since reforms started in the early 1990s (Nepal 
and Jamasb, 2012a). The difficulty of the vulnerable consumers to absorb further price 
increases has been a concern and often prevented pursuing tariff reforms in many transition 
countries (Fankhauser and Tepic, 2007). In Turkey, for example, the introduction of a tariff 
system reflecting the costs affected the production and consumer prices of electricity 
differently. The effect on consumer prices was slightly lesser than for producer prices 
(Akkemik, 2011). 
  
                                                          
8
 In most Sub-Saharan African countries, the average electricity tariff remained almost twice as high as in other 
parts of the world regardless of whether this was prior to or after the reforms. The prevailing high electricity 
tariffs in these countries do not cover the full costs of electricity supply. Countries such as Angola, Malawi, 
South Africa, Zambia and Zimbabwe have maintained highly subsidized prices below the cost levels (Eberhard 
et al., 2011). 
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Table 4: Reforms and Electricity Prices 
Study Approach Region Data Method 
Policy impacts 
and relevance 
Akkemik 
(2011) 
Case study Turkey Macro and micro 
variables with 
focus on energy 
producing 
sectors 
Single 
country; social 
accounting 
matrix 
Cost reflective electricity 
tariff affect consumers 
prices slightly less than 
producer prices 
Anaya (2010) Cost-benefit 
analysis  
Peru Electricity 
distribution 
companies 
(privatised and 
non-privatised) 
Single country Privatisation contributed to 
price increase  
Balza, 
Jimenez and 
Mercado 
(2013) 
Econometric Latin 
America 
Panel data: 18 
countries, 1971-
2010 
Generalised 
least squares 
No robust results in terms 
of privatisation and end-
user-prices; strong and 
robust association between 
regulatory quality and 
electricity prices 
Bhattacharya 
(2007) 
Case study South Asia Power sector 
indicators 
Multi-country Reform undertaken 
produced no significant 
results, electricity prices 
still highly subsidised  
Eberhard et al. 
(2011) 
Case study Africa Power sector 
indicators 
Multi-country Eliminating pricing 
inefficiencies can close the 
funding gap in the power 
sector 
Erdogdu 
(2011) 
Econometric Global Panel data: 63 
developed and 
developing 
countries, 1982-
2009 
Fixed effects, 
random 
effects 
No uniform pattern for the 
impact of reforms process 
as a whole on price-cost 
margins and cross-subsidy 
levels; different impact of 
different reform steps 
ESMAP 
(2011) 
Econometric Global Panel data; 20 
countries with 
different system 
sizes 
Fixed effects, 
random 
effects 
Vertical unbundling 
reduced electricity tariffs 
by 10%  
Estache and 
Rossi (2004) 
Econometric Latin 
America 
Distribution 
companies of 14 
countries 
Correlation Fall is prices in general did 
not match the productivity 
gains 
Fankhauser 
and Tepic 
(2007) 
Case study Transition 
economies 
Affordability 
indicators for 
utilities 
Multi country Level of tariffs needed for 
cost recovery bear 
important affordability 
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consequences 
Haselip and 
Potter (2010) 
Case study Argentina Power sector 
indicators 
Single country Reforms led to price 
decline until 
macroeconomic crisis 
He et al. 
(2011) 
Macro study China Coal and 
electricity prices 
CGE 
modelling 
Coal price increase caused 
a rise in the costs of 
electric power industry 
while the influence 
gradually descended with 
increases in coal price 
Karahan and 
Toptas (2013) 
Case study Turkey Power sector 
indicators 
Single country No reduction in retail 
electricity prices after 
reforms 
Kennedy 
(2003) 
Case study Transition 
economies 
Power sector 
indicators 
Multi-country Implementation of reform 
should be enhanced to 
improve reform 
performance 
Kundu and 
Mishra (2011) 
Econometric Indian 
state of 
Orissa 
Survey based 
approach 
Partial least 
squares 
Some consumers group 
benefited (e.g. industrial) 
while some lost (e.g. 
agricultural) 
Nagayama 
(2007) 
Econometric Global Panel data: 83 
countries (26 
developed); 
1985-2002 
Ordinary least 
squares, fixed 
effects, 
random 
effects 
Neither unbundling nor 
introduction of wholesale 
market on their own 
necessarily reduce prices; 
unbundling may reduce 
prices when coexisting 
with independent regulator 
Nagayama 
(2009) 
Econometric Global Panel data: 78 
developing, 
developed, 
transition 
countries; 1985-
2003 
Ordered 
response, 
fixed effects, 
random 
effects 
Higher electricity prices 
drive liberalisation; 
liberalisation models does 
not necessarily reduce 
electricity price 
Pollitt (2004) Case study Chile Power sector 
indicators 
Single country Average node prices 
declined after reforms 
Sen and 
Jamasb (2012) 
Econometric India Panel data: 19 
Indian states, 
1991-2007 
Bias corrected 
fixed effects 
Political economy factors 
led to adverse outcomes in 
the initial stages of reforms 
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3.1.2. Impacts of reforms on quality of service and access 
One of the principal aims of reforms in most reforming countries has been to enhance the 
quality of energy supply (Joskow, 1998; Briceno-Garmendia et al., 2004). Reforms were 
expected to enhance energy production, lead to efficient utilisation of existing capacities and 
add new capacities by attracting investments and reduce energy losses. Studies by Cubbin 
and Stern (2004, 2006), Erdogdu (2014) and Zhang et al. (2008), find that market competition 
and regulatory governance as result of reforms have brought enhanced service penetration, 
generation capacity expansion, capacity utilization and reserve margins in some developing 
countries. 
The effects of reforms on quality of service and access have differed across the regions as 
showed by Nagayama (2010) using econometric and panel data analysis. The introduction of 
foreign IPPs when coexistent with independent regulators and unbundling on its own 
increased the per capita generation capacity in Asian developing countries while the 
establishment of independent regulator had the opposite effect. The per capita generation 
capacity also increased among the LACs with the introduction of wholesale market and 
power exchange but reforms triggered different impacts on transmission and distribution 
(T&D) losses (Nagayama, 2010). The same study found that the introduction of foreign IPPs 
reduced T&D losses in Asian developing countries. 
On the other hand, private sector investments in the transmission and distribution networks 
contributed to a decline in electricity losses in Latin America (Balza et al., 2013). Technical 
and non-technical losses fell sharply from above 20% in 1992 to just above 10% in 2007 in 
Argentina (Pollitt, 2008). The number of minutes of supply interruption per year fell to 2.1 in 
2003 from 9.6 in 1997 in Chile while distribution losses fell from 19.8% in 1987 to 5.6% in 
2003 (Pollitt, 2004). Also, generation capacity increased in many LACs except in Brazil post 
reforms (Millan, 2005). 
Reforms triggered different impacts on the plant load factor, T&D losses and gross electricity 
generation among the Indian states (Sen and Jamasb, 2012). Unbundling and tariff orders had 
a positive and significant effect on plant load factors. Gross electricity generation in India 
increased with the introduction of the IPPs while privatisation of the distribution segment led 
to lower energy losses. The average level of T&D losses in Sub-Saharan Africa was around 
27.5% in 2009 although the system losses substantially range from 14.5% in Angola to 68% 
in Swaziland (ESMAP, 2009). Reforms have also been unable to reduce electricity theft in 
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most regions of the developing world considering that the quality of governance such as 
effective accountability, political stability, and government effectiveness and corruption 
control can reduce energy theft in developing countries (Smith, 2004). 
The international experience with restructuring, privatisation and liberalisation has exposed 
the vulnerabilities in electricity supply in various countries (Hall, 1999). For example, the end 
of 1997 saw repeated power cuts in Rio de Janerio, Brazil followed by Buenos Aires, 
Argentina where a 10-day blackout occurred in 1999. These supply vulnerabilities coincide 
with the less than anticipated increase in private investments in the transmission and 
distribution networks in the reforming countries. In addition, the progress toward reforms has 
coincided with limited government support for research and development (R&D) something 
that threatens the sustainability of efficiency improvements in the electricity industries of 
developing countries (Erdogdu, 2013). 
Electricity reforms in developing countries were often mooted with a view to increase access 
across all segments of the population (Sinha, 2003). This is because the participation of the 
private sector in energy production provides more investment to expand the electricity supply 
capacity and thus would also enhance the access to electricity. However, the evidence on 
electrification is mixed. In South Asia, reforms did not necessarily accelerate access to 
energy, whereas in Latin America, it reached many new consumers. Sihag et al. (2007) finds 
that the reform in the Indian State of Orissa, did not help enhance the electrification rate. 
Based on the South Asian experience, Bhattacharyya (2006) concludes that initiatives aimed 
at intensifying rural electrification have had limited impact in improving the energy access 
for the poor in the region. 
On the other hand, other studies, such as, Balza et al. (2013) and Kozulj and Di Sbroiavacca 
(2004) show that electricity sector reforms had increased electricity coverage in parts of 
South America. For example, the post-reform electrification rates in Argentina, Peru and El 
Salvador respectively increased to 95, 72 and 76% from the respective pre-reform rates of 91, 
38 and 62%. In Chile, the number of households without electricity decreased to 14% in 2002 
from 62% in 1982 after reforms (Pollitt, 2004). 
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Table 5: Reforms and Electricity Quality and Access 
Study Approach Region Data Method 
Policy impacts and 
relevance 
Cubbin and Stern 
(2004) 
Econometrics Global Panel data: 28 
developing 
countries; 1980-
2001 
OLS, fixed 
effects 
Regulatory law and 
governance positively 
related to higher per 
capita electricity 
generation and capacity 
Cubbin and Stern 
(2006) 
Econometrics Global Panel data: 28 
developing 
countries; 1980-
2001 
Fixed 
effects, error 
correction 
models 
Regulatory law and 
governance positively 
related to higher per 
capita electricity 
capacity controlling for 
privatization and 
competition 
Erdogdu (2013) Econometrics Global Panel data: 27 
countries, 1974-
2008 
Fixed 
effects; 
random 
effects 
Reform progress led to 
decline in R&D 
investments 
Erdogdu (2014) Econometrics Global Panel data: 55 
developed and 
developing 
countries, 1975-
2010 
Fixed 
effects, 
random 
effects 
Reform progress led to 
higher levels of 
electricity supply self-
sufficiency 
ESMAP (2009) Case study Sub-
Saharan 
Africa 
Power sector 
indicators 
Multi 
country 
High number of 
outages per year and 
long delays with 
electrical connections 
ESMAP (2011) Econometrics Global Panel data; 20 
countries with 
different system 
sizes 
Fixed 
effects; 
random 
effects 
Introduction of 
independent regulation 
escalated access by 
50% 
Hall (1999) Case study Global Power sector 
indicators 
Multi-
country 
reforms have coincided 
with rising power cuts 
and blackouts 
Kozulj and 
Sbroiavacca 
(2004) 
Case study Latin 
America 
Power sector 
indicators 
Multi-
country 
electrification levels 
increased after reforms 
Millan (2005) Case study Latin 
America 
Power sector 
indicators 
Multi 
country 
generation capacity 
expanded vigorously 
except in Brazil after 
reforms 
Nagayama (2010) Econometrics Global Panel data: 86 
developed and 
developing 
countries, 1985-
2006 
Fixed 
effects 
IPPs, unbundling, 
regulatory agency and 
creating wholesale 
markets reduced 
transmission and 
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distribution losses  
Nepal and 
Jamasb (2012a) 
Econometrics Transition 
economies 
Panel data: 27 
countries, 1990-
2010 
Bias 
corrected 
fixed effects 
Power sector reform on 
its own did not produce 
any significant impacts 
on T&D losses 
Nepal and 
Jamasb (2012b) 
Case study Nepal Power sector 
indicators 
Single 
country 
Electricity losses in 
South-Asia including 
Nepal still remain high, 
capacity and power 
shortages prevail 
Pollitt (2008) Case study Argentina Power sector 
indicators 
Single 
country 
Reforms successful in 
improving quality prior 
to the collapse of 
Argentine peso 
Prasad (2008) Case study Africa Energy sector 
indicators 
Multi-
country 
Energy reforms only 
impacts access when 
adjusted to local 
conditions of the poor 
Smith (2004) Case study/ 
econometrics 
Global 102 countries: 
electricity losses, 
governance 
indicators for 
1980 and 2000 
Correlation/ 
multi 
country 
Losses have increased 
in many developing 
countries after reforms 
Zhang et al. 
(2005) 
Econometrics Global Panel data: 25 
developing 
countries, 1985-
2001 
Fixed 
effects 
Independent regulation 
and competition before 
privatisation important 
for higher electricity 
generation and capacity 
Zhang et al. 
(2008) 
Econometric Global Panel data: 51 
developing 
countries, 1985-
2000 
Fixed 
effects 
On their own 
privatisation and 
regulation do not lead 
to obvious gains in 
economic performance 
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3.1.3. Impacts of reforms on productivity and economic efficiency 
9
 
The changes in market structure, the role of the state and the regulation of the sector were all 
aimed at improving utility efficiency and productivity levels through the introduction of 
market competition (Wolfram, 1999). The evidence of reforms in improving efficiency and 
productivity in the electricity sector is positive especially in Latin America, which is also the 
most studied region. However, the efficiency and productivity impacts of these reforms 
remain least studied in South Asia and Africa. There are only few international studies of 
utility efficiency and reforms. 
An earlier study by Yunos and Hawdon (1997) found that changes in the ownership did not 
automatically resolve the efficiency problems in the absence of competition among the least 
developed countries and significant efficiency gaps persisted between small scale and large 
electricity providers. Rodriguez-Pardina and Rossi (2000) finds some evidence that suggest 
that reforming countries had a better performance than those which did not. Although 
technical efficiency among the major distribution companies in South America marginally 
improved between 1994 and 2001, the results suggested considerable scope for improvement 
among the firms (Estache et al., 2004). The increments in productivity seem to be in line with 
the degree of incentives built in regulation while private companies operating under rate of 
return regulation exhibited similar labor productivity levels as public firms (Estache and 
Rossi, 2005). 
The labor productivity in the electricity distribution experienced an increase after reforms in 
Argentina (Pollitt, 2008) and in Chile since the privatisation of leading companies (Fischer et 
al., 2003). The incorporation of distribution value added (VAD) in the tariff setting processes 
and regulation of distribution utilities contributed to efficiency of distribution in Chile 
(Sanhueza et al., 2004). In Brazil, where privatisation took place before the establishment of 
the sector regulator, it showed no statistically significant impact on operating cost efficiency 
of distribution but technical efficiency declined when considering the total expenditures 
(Motta, 2004). Overall, the reform in Brazil does not seem to have improved the efficiency of 
the distribution networks between 1998 and 2005 (Ramos-Real et al., 2009). 
                                                          
9
 Economic efficiency is a combination of technical and allocative efficiency (Coelli et al., 2005). Firms 
operating on the production frontier are said to be technically efficient while allocative efficiency in input 
selection imply selecting that mix of inputs (such as labor and capital) that produces a given quantity of output 
at minimum cost (given the input prices which prevail). Productivity of a firm is the ratio of the output(s) that it 
produces to the input(s) that it uses. 
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In Peru, earlier studies by Bonifaz and Rodguez (2001) and Bonifaz and Santin (2000) using 
3 years of data (1995-1998) found little evidence of technical improvement in electricity 
distribution while privatised distribution firms did not outperform the state owned utilities. 
However, later studies such as by Perez-Reyes and Tovar (2009; 2010) using a decade long 
data (1996-2006) showed improvements in efficiency and productivity of electricity 
distribution in Peru occurred with the adoption of regulatory reform although privatisation 
proved to be advantageous only in the initial years after the reform. There seems to exist a 
positive relationship between the restructuring and reform of electricity distribution and 
productivity improvement in Peru. Management practices seem to be important in the 
Peruvian electricity distribution due to which private utilities are less inefficient than public 
utilities (Bonifaz and Jaramillo, 2010). 
In Colombia, the reforms of the 1990s improved the average efficiency levels of electricity 
distribution with regulatory policy engendering a positive effect while ownership produced 
no conclusive effect (Pombo and Ramirez, 2002a). Technological improvements and 
regulatory policy have had a positive effect on average efficiency but the divide between 
good performers and bad performers widened after the reforms (Pombo and Ramirez, 2002b). 
Mello and Espinoza (2004) found no significant productivity change among the 20 
distribution companies between 1993 and 2003, although contextual factors mattered 
significantly. In contrast, Pombo and Taborda (2006) showed that plant efficiency and 
productivity increased after the regulatory reform of 1994 although the efficiency of 
distribution companies did not improve. Nonetheless, the Colombian distribution network 
exhibits high and persistent inefficiency among firms (Galan and Pollitt, 2014). Rural 
companies and firms with small customers seem to have experienced the largest efficiency 
gains over the 15 years after the reforms. 
Estache et al. (2008) attempted at documenting efficiency levels in Africa's electricity firms 
based on a sample of 12 operators providing services in the 12 countries of the Southern 
Africa Power Pool. The study relied on the DEA decomposition technique to estimate the 
changes in total factor productivity (TFP). The results showed comparable levels of 
efficiency and performance levels in the region but found no clear correlation between the 
efficiency improvements with the adoption of reforms. In Sub-Saharan Africa, an early 
efficiency analysis of the Côte d’Ivoire electricity companies did not find significant 
performance improvement in post-privatization period and the technical efficiency measures 
behaved irregularly since privatization (Plane, 1999). 
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Some studies have examined efficiency and productivity effects of reforms in the transition 
economies of Eastern Europe. In Poland, technical efficiency of the distribution companies 
increased during the transition process while allocative efficiency deteriorated (Cullman and 
von Hirschhausen, 2008a). The cross-country analysis suggested that the Polish distribution 
companies were marginally inefficient while the Czech Republic featured the highest 
efficiency while Slovakia and Hungary occupied the middle range (Cullman and von 
Hirschhausen, 2008b). The efficiency analysis of the Ukrainian privately and publicly-owned 
distribution firms after a new regulatory authority and distribution privatisations suggested 
that private firms reduced commercial and non-commercial network losses more than the 
publicly owned firms (Berg et al., 2005). This implies that privatization had a positive effect 
on technical efficiency in all four countries. Also, the average efficiency of thermal 
generation plants grew in China and autonomy from the central government was one of the 
important determinants (Lam and Shiu, 2004). In Turkey, private distributors showed better 
technical scale efficiency on average during the early years of reforms (Bagdadioglu et al., 
1996; Celen, 2013). 
A limited number of studies have assessed the efficiency and productivity of the reforms in 
developing Asian countries. The performance and efficiency analysis of the Indian generation 
companies supported the policy of unbundling the sector while state owned companies 
appeared inefficient (Jain et al., 2010). However, privatisation brought about different 
impacts on employee productivity in the state of Orissa as some employees benefitted while 
others did not (Kundu and Mishra, 2012). In contrast, technical performance in the Thai 
electricity industry was mainly driven by technological and productivity improvements 
(Wattana and Sharma, 2011). In the Philippines, productivity did not improve significantly 
despite the reforms being instituted in 2001 (Bautista et al., 2011). 
In China, unbundling of the integrated electricity utility - the State Power Corporation (SPC) 
improved productivity and operational efficiency among the large coal-fired power plants 
controlling for substantial heterogeneity in the technical profile of the plants (Zhao and Ma, 
2013). Finally, empirical analysis by Nakano and Managi (2008) and Goto and Sueyoshi 
(2009) showed that deregulation and regulatory reforms contributed to productivity growth in 
steam power-generation sector in Japan for the period 1978-2003. 
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Table 6: Reforms and Efficiency and Productivity 
Study Approach Region Data Method 
Policy impacts and 
relevance 
Bagdadioglo, 
et al. (1996) 
Non-
parametric 
Turkey Cross section of 
70 distribution 
operators in 1991 
DEA Private operators are 
more efficient than 
public operators 
Bautista et al. 
(2011) 
Non-
parametric 
Philippines 120 electric 
cooperatives, 
2001 to 2006 
DEA Reforms did not drive 
productivity in the 
sector 
Berg et al. 
(2005) 
Parametric/n
on-
parametric 
Ukraine 24 distribution 
companies, 1998-
2002 
Stochastic 
production 
frontier/DE
A 
Private operators 
responded well to 
incentives than public 
operators, perverse 
regulation worsens 
incentives 
Bonifaz and 
Santin (2000) 
Non-
parametric 
Peru Panel of 19 
distribution 
operators 1995-
1998 
DEA with 
2
nd
 stage 
regressions 
Privatisation did not 
lead to an improvement 
in terms of efficiency 
Bonifaz and 
Jaramillo 
(2010) 
Parametric Peru Panel of 19 
distribution 
companies for the 
period 2000-2008 
Stochastic 
cost frontier 
Private utilities are less 
inefficient than public 
utilities due to better 
management practices 
Celen (2013) Non-
parametric 
Turkey 21 companies for 
the period 2002-
2009 
DEA with
 
Tobit 2
nd
 
stage 
regression 
Private ownership 
positively affect 
efficiencies 
Cullman and 
von 
Hirschhausen 
(2008a) 
Parametric/n
on-
parametric 
Poland 32 distribution 
companies 
between 1997 to 
2002 
DEA/SFA Technical efficiency 
improved with reforms 
but allocative efficiency 
deteriorated 
Cullman and 
von 
Hirschhausen 
(2008b) 
Non-
parametric 
Poland, 
Czech 
Republic, 
Slovakia, 
Hungary 
47 Eastern 
European regional 
companies, 37 
German 
companies 
DEA/Free 
Disposal 
Hall  
Czech Republic and 
Slovakia feature the 
highest efficiency, 
privatisation had a 
positive effect in all 
countries 
ESMAP 
(2011) 
Parametric Global Distribution 
companies from 
20 countries with 
different system 
sizes 
Fixed 
effects; 
random 
effects 
Introduction of 
independent regulator 
increased labor 
productivity by twice as 
high as systems that 
have introduced 
regulation 
Estache et al. 
(2004) 
Parametric/ 
non-
parametric 
Latin 
America 
84 electricity 
distribution 
companies 1994-
Stochastic 
cost 
function, 
Technical efficiency 
marginally improved 
but scope for 
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2001 DEA, labor 
requirement 
function 
improvement remains 
Estache and 
Rossi (2005) 
Parametric Latin 
America 
127 distribution 
companies 1994-
2001 
Stochastic 
production 
function/lab
or 
requirement 
function 
Incentives in embedded 
in regulation crucial for 
productivity increases 
Estache et al. 
(2008) 
Non-
parametric 
Southern 
African 
countries 
12 operators of 12 
different 
countries, 1998-
2005 
DEA No clear correlation 
between adoption of 
reforms and 
improvements in 
efficiency 
Galan and 
Pollitt (2014) 
Parametric Colombia Panel of 21 
electricity 
distribution firms 
for the period 
1998-2012 
Dynamic 
SFA model 
Increases in efficiency 
among rural firms only 
manifested during the 
last five years driven by 
improvements in service 
quality and energy 
losses occurred 
Goto and 
Sueyoshi 
(2009) 
Parametric Japan Annual 
observations in 9 
companies from 
1983-2003 
Multi-
product 
translog cost 
function, 
random 
effects 
maximum 
likelihood 
estimator 
Improvements in 
productivity growth 
after deregulation 
Jain, Thakur 
and Shandilya 
(2010) 
Parametric/n
on-
parametric 
India 30 state –owned 
utilities for the 
year 2007-2008 
DEA/SFA Unbundling drives 
efficiency in electricity 
generation 
Lam and Shiu 
(2004) 
Non-
parametric 
China Panel of 30 
municipal 
autonomous 
regions and 
provincial thermal 
plants 1995-1996 
DEA with
 
2
nd
 stage 
regressions 
Average efficiency 
increased at 2% 
Malik et al. 
(2015) 
Parametric India Unbalanced panel 
of 385 electricity 
generating units 
for the years 
1998-2009 
Panel data 
econometric 
based in 
fixed effects 
States unbundling 
before the Electricity 
Act of 2003 experienced 
improvements in 
operational efficiency 
especially 3-5 years 
after unbundling 
Mello and 
Espinoza 
Parametric Colombia Panel of 20 
distribution 
Free 
Disposal 
Environmental variables 
mattered significantly 
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(2004) companies 1999-
2003 
Hull (FDH) 
Motta (2004) Parametric/ 
non-
parametric 
Brazil Distribution 
companies 1994 
and 2000 
DEA/ 
Stochastic 
production 
frontier 
Privatisation has no 
effect on operating cost 
efficiency, makes case 
for including capital 
costs in benchmarking 
Nakano and 
Managi (2008) 
Parametric/ 
non-
parametric 
Japan 10 companies, 
1965-2003 
DEA/ 
generalised 
method of 
moments 
Regulatory reforms 
have contributed to 
productivity growth in 
the steam power-
generation 
Perez-Reyes 
and Tovar 
(2009) 
Non-
parametric 
Peru 14 distribution 
companies for the 
period 1996-2006 
DEA Reforms led to 
improvements in 
efficiency and 
productivity 
Perez-Reyes 
and Tovar 
(2010) 
Parametric Peru 14 distribution 
companies 
between 1996 and 
2006 
Distance 
function 
Incentives lead by the 
reform process made 
firms more efficient 
Plane (1999) Parametric Côte 
d’Ivoire 
Time-series from 
1959-1995 
Stochastic 
production 
function 
Significant but irregular 
gains from the 
privatization of 
management 
Pollitt (1995) Non-
parametric 
Global 768 thermal plants 
from 14 countries 
including South 
Africa and 
Thailand 
DEA with 
2
nd
 stage 
regressions 
/Tobit 
Privatisation did not 
lower costs in the short 
run, government 
interference with 
investment increase 
costs 
Pombo and 
Ramirez 
(2002a) 
Non-
parametric 
Colombia Panel of 33 
distribution 
companies from 
1988-2000 
DEA with 
2
nd
 stage 
regression 
Reforms improved 
average efficiency 
levels 
Pombo and 
Ramirez 
(2002b) 
Non-
parametric 
Colombia Panel of 33 
generation and 12 
distribution 
companies 1988-
2000 
DEA with 
2
nd
 stage 
regression 
Technology 
improvements and 
regulatory policy had 
positive effect on 
average efficiency 
levels 
Pombo and 
Taborda 
(2006) 
Non-
parametric 
Colombia 12 electricity 
distribution 
companies from 
1985-2001 
DEA Profitability, partial 
input productivity, and 
output improved; plant 
efficiency and 
productivity increased 
after reform 
Ramos-Real et Non- Brazil Panel of 18 DEA Incentives generated in 
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al. (2009) parametric distribution 
companies from 
1998-2005 
the reforms process 
incapable of making 
firms behave in more 
efficient manner 
Rodriguez-
Pardina and 
Rossi (2000) 
Parametric South 
America 
30 electricity 
distribution 
companies from 
10 countries 1994-
1998 
stochastic 
production 
function 
Partial evidence of 
reformers performing 
better than non-
reformers 
Sanhueza et 
al. (2004) 
Non-
parametric 
Chile 35 distribution 
companies for the 
year 2000 
DEA Incorporating 
distribution VAD 
improved efficiency 
Wattana and 
Sharma (2011) 
Non-
parametric 
Thailand Thai electric 
industry, time 
series data from 
1980-2006  
DEA Industry reforms not 
significant in driving 
efficiency 
Yunos and 
Hawdon 
(1997) 
Non-
parametric 
Least 
developed 
countries 
Cross-section 
generation data, 
27 countries, 
panel of utilities 
of Malaysia, 
Thailand and UK 
1975-1990 
DEA Ownership change does 
not resolve efficiency 
problems in the absence 
of competition, 
efficiency gaps between 
small scale and large 
providers  
Zhao and Ma 
(2013) 
Non-
parametric 
China Balanced panel: 
34 large power 
plants for 1997-
2010 
DEA Operation efficiency 
improved on average, 
unbundling boosted 
productivity 
 
3.2. Macroeconomic Impacts of Reforms 
This section reviews the literature analyzing the impacts of reforms on macroeconomic 
indicators such as economic welfare, economic growth and poverty reduction. Electricity is 
one of the main inputs to economic development especially in developing countries where 
economic growth is constrained due to lack of infrastructure and reliable supply of electricity 
(Stern and Kander, 2012). Therefore, any programs and policies that relax the electricity 
supply constraints are expected to generate positive impacts on economic welfare and growth 
and also reduce poverty. Below we discuss this argument based on empirical evidence. 
 
3.2.1. Impacts of reforms on economic welfare 
The economy-wide welfare impacts of reforms are examined by a few studies. Galal et al. 
(1994) estimated the welfare impacts of the privatisation of the Chilean distribution and 
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generation companies and is one of the first and most comprehensive such studies. The 
privatisation of the Chilean electricity companies (a distribution and a power generation 
utility) led to a permanent gain in social welfare equivalent to 2.1% of 1986 sales value. 
However, the gains were achieved at a fiscal loss
10
 and two-thirds of the aggregate gains 
accrued to foreign shareholders. In Brazil, approximately 60% of the distribution market and 
20% of the generation market was privatized between 1995 and 2000. The privatization of 
the distribution created a one-off gain equivalent to 2.5% of the GDP in the form of the 
privatization proceeds although the producers captured two-thirds of the proceeds (Mota, 
2003). Consumers could have benefited more from privatization had the regulatory 
institutions been fully established at the beginning of the privatization process. The economic 
welfare impacts of partial privatization and restructuring in Peru proved worthwhile and the 
gains amounted to 542 million $US in 2007 prices (Anaya, 2010). The distribution of the 
gains suggested that government and producers benefited the most from welfare gains while 
consumers benefited the least. 
Toba (2007) studied the welfare impacts of private sector participation in the Philippines 
electricity generation, through liberalization of the market for IPPs during the power crisis of 
1990-1993. The introduction of IPPs presented significant gains contributing to resolving the 
crisis and promoting economic and social development while consumers and investors were 
the net gainers. However, only about one-quarter of the total private investors’ gains are 
transferred to the domestic investors, as most investors are assumed to be foreigners. The 
largest share of the net benefit equivalent to a net present value of 10.4 billion $US (in 1999 
prices) was distributed to consumers. At the same time, the domestic and foreign investors 
also gained while the government was the loser. 
In Israel, Tisher et al. (2006) undertook a cost-benefit analysis summarizing the government's 
reform plan using an unregulated regime as the counterfactual. The results suggested that the 
government's reform plan would only yield a small net benefit even when it was carried out 
flawlessly relative to the regulated regime. The reforms would also lead to large increases in 
electricity producers’ profit and government tax receipts at the expense of the consumers. As 
such, a less-than-perfect transition to competition could easily preclude the potential gains of 
the government plan. 
 
                                                          
10
 The fiscal loss would have some negative implications to social welfare, which was ignored by the study. 
32 
 
Table 7: Welfare Effects of Reforms 
 
Study Approach 
Country/ 
Region 
Date Method 
Policy impacts and 
relevance 
Anaya 
(2010) 
Single country 
case study 
Peru Privatisation of 2 
electricity 
distribution 
companies: 
Electrolima and 
Electro Sur Medio 
Social cost-
benefit 
analysis 
Privatisation was 
worthwhile in terms of 
social welfare, 
government and 
producers benefited the 
most while consumers 
benefitted the least due 
to price increases 
Galal et al. 
(1994) 
Multi-country 
case studies 
Global Before and after 
performance 
indicators data of 
public enterprises 
divestitures in UK, 
Chile, Malaysia and 
Mexico 
Social cost-
benefit 
analysis 
Privatisation combined 
with regulation can 
enhance welfare, private 
ownership improves 
efficiency of generation, 
promotes profit 
maximisation and 
increases value of 
regulation 
Mota 
(2003) 
Single country 
case study 
Brazil Privatisation of 21 
electricity 
distribution and 
supply businesses 
between 1995-2000 
Social cost-
benefit 
analysis 
Economic welfare (net 
benefits) was significant 
but most of it went to the 
producers; consumers 
could have benefited 
more from privatisation 
in the presence of 
tougher regulation 
Tishler et 
al. (2006) 
Single country 
case study 
Israel Impacts on the 
generation, 
transmission and 
distribution in 
accordance to the 
2003 government 
announcement to 
undertake a 
functional 
unbundling of ESI  
Cost-benefit 
analysis 
Reform will only yield a 
small net benefit even 
when carried out 
flawlessly, will increase 
profits for producers and 
government tax receipts 
at the expense of 
customers, incentive 
regulation of the sector 
thereby is desirable 
Toba 
(2007) 
Single country 
case study 
Philippines disaggregated and 
detailed datasets 
covering  pre and 
post private 
participation periods 
from 1988 to 1997 
Social cost- 
benefit 
analysis 
Consumers and investors 
were net gainers while 
the government lost, 
reform with private 
participation increased 
economic welfare 
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3.2.2. Impacts of reforms on economic growth 
A few studies have provided evidence of positive impacts of reforms on economic growth. 
Lack of electricity infrastructure and reliable energy supplies constrain economic growth in 
developing countries (Bruns et al., 2014). Sen and Jamasb (2012) show that increased stock 
of electricity infrastructure has made a significant contribution to industrial economic output 
in India. Also, Easterly and Levine (2003), Rodrik et al. (2004) and Acemoglu and Robinson 
(2010) show a positive relationship between stock (as well as quality) of the infrastructure 
and per capita GDP growth. 
Empirical evidence also suggests a strong and positive link between regulatory quality in all 
economic sectors and economic performance in developing countries (Jalilian et al., 2007). 
Electricity reforms can stimulate economic growth by improving access to commercial 
electricity (Ozturk, 2010). However, only a few studies have directly examined whether the 
reforms serve as determinants of economic growth by using per capita GDP and employment 
levels as indicators of economic growth.  
Nepal and Jamasb (2012a) and Carvalho et al. (2016) examine the impact of reforms on per 
capita GDP in transition economies, particularly in the Former Soviet Republics (FSR). The 
results show significant and positive impacts of reforms on GDP. Similar results have been 
found for India in Sen and Jamasb (2012), which econometrically analyzed the determinants 
and impact of electricity sector reforms in the Indian states, giving special regard to the 
political economy and regional diversity factors of the country. 
Chisari et al. (1999) estimated the macroeconomic effects of privatisation and regulation of 
utilities including energy that began in 1989 in Argentina. The privatization of generation and 
distribution and gas all had positive effect on GDP. The privatisation of the gas sector had the 
greatest effect on GDP amounting to 0.31% increase in GDP in the presence of regulation. 
Privatization of energy utilities did not contribute to the sharp rise in unemployment between 
1993 and 1995. The fiscal consequences of privatization and regulation of infrastructure 
utilities including energy suggested that the country gained more in macroeconomic terms 
from the net present value of subsidy cuts (Benitez et al., 2001). Reallocating the resources 
freed up by energy subsidies removal to more productive public spending can help boost 
economic growth over the long run (IMF, 2013). 
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Table 8: Reforms and Economic Growth 
Study Approach Region Data Method 
Policy impacts 
and relevance 
Benitez et 
al. (2001) 
Macro study Argentina Privatisation, fiscal 
reforms and 
regulation data 
CGE Gaines from subsidy cuts 
and reforms, and 
privatisation of energy 
utilities not responsible for 
increased unemployment 
Chisari et 
al. (1999) 
Macro study Argentina Performance data 
before and after 
privatisation of the 
argentine utilities 
CGE model Privatisation resulted in 
different types of efficiency 
gains with significant 
macro-economic benefits, 
privatisation not the cause 
for rising unemployment 
IMF 
(2013) 
Case study Global Energy and 
economy level data 
Multi-
country 
Subsidies removal boost 
economic growth in the 
long run 
Nepal and 
Jamasb 
(2012a) 
Econometric Transition 
economies 
Panel data: 27 
countries, 1990-
2010 
Bias 
corrected 
fixed effects 
Reform index has positive 
effect on GDP 
Sen and 
Jamasb 
(2012) 
Econometric India Panel data: 19 
Indian states, 1991-
2007 
Bias 
corrected 
fixed effects 
Reforms positively affected 
the GDP 
Carvalho 
et al. 
(2016) 
Econometric CIS and 
Non-CIS 
countries 
Panel data: 25 
transition countries 
1992-2007 
Corrected 
LSDV 
Reforms had positive effect 
on GDP index in CIS and 
Non-CIS countries 
 
3.2.3. Impacts of reforms on poverty alleviation 
The literature on infrastructure reforms and the linkages to poverty shows that policy changes 
to improve the access and quality of infrastructure services help reduce poverty through 
direct and indirect channels, such as more opportunities to generate income, improving health 
and educational outcomes (Estache and Fay, 1995; Brenneman and Kerf, 2002). Hence, 
electricity reforms aimed at improving the access and supply reliability are expected to 
contribute to poverty reduction. However, the existing studies have not empirically examined 
the evidence. In fact, some studies examining this issue empirically (e.g., Victor, 2005) found 
no inherent connection between the energy markets reforms and welfare for the poorest 
households although energy consumption and economic growth are correlated. 
The efficiency gains from privatization of energy utilities in Argentina accrued mostly to 
high-income classes, while the gains from effective regulation of newly privatized utilities 
accrued mainly to low-income classes (Chisari et al., 1999). All income groups benefited 
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from reforms while the distribution of income also improved (Navajas, 2000). In general, 
incidences of final electricity price reductions were experienced post reforms in Latin 
America although the price fall did not translate into increased affordability and access for 
the poor households. The electric utilities and the governments shared most of the gains in the 
form of rents and higher tax revenue (Estache and Rossi, 2004). In Peru, electricity 
consumers benefited the least from reforms as welfare gains were offset by price increases 
(Anaya, 2010). Nonetheless, the welfare consequences of gaining access to the electricity 
networks are high. 
The extent to which electricity reform affects the poor primarily depends on the ability of 
reforms to enhance access. For example, energy poor also tend to be income poor as 
evidenced from India establishing a clear link between income poverty and energy poverty 
(Khandker et al., 2012a). Rural electrification also helped reduce poverty in India even 
though the larger share of benefits accrued to wealthier rural households (Khandker, et al., 
2014). In addition, grid electrification in Bangladesh generated significant positive impacts 
on household income, expenditure and education where the household gain in total income 
due to electrification was around 21%, with a 1.5 percentage point reduction in poverty per 
year (Khandker et al., 2012b). Similarly, access to communal grid electricity generated 
externality benefits for the poor than the rich in Vietnam while access to household electricity 
benefited the rich than poor questioning the rural electrification’s long term benefits for the 
overall rural economy (Khandker et al., 2013). 
Some studies have examined distributional impacts of specific aspects of reforms, such as 
pricing reforms. Boccanfuso et al. (2009a) assess the distributional effects of pricing reform 
in Senegal. They found that increases in electricity prices bear little direct impact on most 
poor households as only few of them are connected to the network. Compensating measures 
such as cash transfers in the face of price increase slightly decreases income inequality 
between poor and rich households. Similar effects were observed regarding the distributional 
and poverty effects of price reform in Mali, a poor country in West Africa (Boccanfuso et al., 
2009b). The increase in prices did not affect poverty directly as very few poor households are 
connected to the grid while households also reduce their electricity consumption when price 
rises. Unlike in Senegal, compensating measures such as cash transfer after the price rise did 
not help the low-income households losing from pricing reform. Based on the broad trends of 
energy reforms across the African countries, Clark et al. (2005) show that the impacts of 
reforms on the poor are neither direct nor inevitable. 
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Table 9: Reforms and Poverty Reduction 
Study Approach Region Data Method Policy impacts and relevance 
ADB (2005) Case study Asia Macro-micro 
data 
Multi-
country 
Strong links between 
investments in energy 
infrastructure and rural poverty 
reduction in Thailand and India 
Betily et al. 
(2013) 
Macro study Ukraine Household 
survey data for 
2009 
CGE model Increases in gas prices result in 
welfare losses across all 
households, with a more 
impact on urban households 
Boccanfuso 
et al. (2009a) 
Macro study Senegal Macro –micro 
variables 
between 1995 to 
2001 
CGE model Direct price effects are weaker 
than general equilibrium 
effects on poverty and 
inequality 
Boccanfuso 
et al. (2009b) 
Macro study Mali Macro –micro 
variables  
CGE model Direct price increases have 
minimal effect on poverty and 
inequality, whereas their 
general equilibrium effects are 
quite strong and negative 
Clark et al. 
(2005) 
Case study Africa Energy sector 
indicators, 
macro variables 
Multi-
country 
Impacts of reforms on the poor 
are neither direct nor inevitable 
Estache et al. 
(2002) 
Case study Latin 
America 
Macro-micro 
variables 
Multi-
country 
Evidence of reforms on 
poverty reduction is scarce; 
hence the analysis remain 
incomplete 
Khandker et 
al. (2012a) 
Econometric India Cross-section 
survey data for 
house-holds, 
2005 
Probit 
estimates 
Energy poverty and income 
poverty are directly linked to 
each other 
Khandker et 
al. (2012b) 
Econometric Bangla-
desh 
Cross-section 
survey data for 
households, 
2005 
propensity 
score 
matching 
Electrification led to household 
gains in income and poverty 
reduction 
Khandker et 
al. (2012) 
Econometric India Cross-section 
survey data for 
households, 
2005 
maximum 
likelihood 
probit 
model 
Rural electrification helped 
reduce poverty; larger share of 
benefits accrued to wealthier 
rural households 
Solaymani et 
al. (2013) 
Macro study Malaysia Time series 
macro and micro 
data 
CGE model Subsidy removal can 
potentially lead to significant 
falls in rural household 
incomes and rising poverty 
levels among rural households 
Victor (2005) Case study Global Energy sector 
indicators 
Multi-
country 
Energy access and 
development correlated; link 
between reform and poverty 
reduction complex and non-
inherent 
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4. CRITICAL REFLECTIONS ON THE LITERATURE AND REFORMS 
 
4.1. Evolution of the Reform Literature 
The differences in the implementation and performance of reforms in developing and 
transition countries call for reflection on and taking stock of the experience in the span of 
more than quarter of a century and beyond the findings of individual countries and studies. 
The early reform trend was built on the principals of neoclassical economics, relying on 
competition for external efficiency and privatization for internal efficiency. It was inspired by 
a paradigm shift in the role of the state in infrastructure industries and public services as well 
as developments in industrial organisation and regulatory economics. 
The initial view of the reforms was a fairly mechanical one meaning that the introduction of a 
specific set of steps would equate to successful implementation and scorecards could reflect 
and compare the progress of reform process (e.g., Bacon, 2001). For example, optimal 
sequencing of the reform steps also received some attention (IEA, 2000). Overall, reforms led 
to efficiency improvements (operational efficiency, labour productivity, etc.) as evidenced in 
the earlier studies. However, a combination of market and regulatory failure have meant the 
obtained efficiency gains did not automatically trickle down, as initially thought. This has 
created a chasm with the losers and has led to questioning the merits and motives of the 
reforms. 
Attention was gradually directed at the role of regulation. Frequent renegotiations of 
contracts and concessions signalled that all was not well in the regulation front (Estache et 
al., 2003). The importance of regulation for fostering successful competition and privatisation 
in developing countries became the subject of both theoretical and empirical analysis (e.g., 
Laffont, 2005; Zhang et al., 2008). Moreover, most electricity networks in developing 
countries exhibited significant inefficiencies and required incentive regulation regimes. 
However, to date, apart from a number of efficiency and productivity studies, the empirical 
research on the effectiveness of incentive regulation of networks in developing countries has 
been limited. 
Although the need for independent sector regulation was recognised from the outset, initially 
the importance of the wider formal and informal institutional context for effective functioning 
of the new authorities was not apparent. Gradually, the role of high level and sector level 
institutional norms and rules in the effectiveness of independent regulation to support the 
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reforms was recognised. Since the 2000s, a number of studies, have examined the 
institutional aspects of reforms on electricity sector performance and concluded that an 
effective institutional framework is a prerequisite for managing a reformed power sector. 
This led to the realization that much of the observed heterogeneity in the performance of 
reforms was due to the inability of the policy makers to properly understand and take into 
account the country specific context of reforms (Sen et al., 2016). 
The ineffectiveness of the ‘one size fits all’ approach to reforms was gradually and inevitably 
recognized. Also, in the light of the reform in Norway, privatization can now be perceived as 
an option rather than an integral part of the reform. It was also broadly recognised that 
electricity reform in developing and transition economies is closely linked with the country-
specific political economy and institutional contexts. 
 
4.2. Microeconomic Lessons from the Literature 
The principal of cost-reflective pricing remains is central to well-functioning of market based 
reform models. Also in practice, reforms have generated pressure for revenue adequacy 
prompting the realignment of prices with underlying costs (Jamasb et al., 2005). Some 
reforms led to reduction in average wholesale prices to cost-reflective levels but not 
necessarily in the retail prices. Reforms led to cost-reflective pricing in some countries in 
Latin America and decreasing the price-cost margin across the industries and households. In a 
growing number of countries the policies of under-pricing and cross-subsidies are gradually 
being reversed post reforms. 
The presence of an independent sector regulator and institutional quality seem to facilitate the 
transition to cost-reflective pricing and mitigate the adverse impacts of price increases by 
allowing some efficiency gains to be passed on to consumers (Estache and Rodriguez-
Pardina, 1999). Hence, price adjustments can be undertaken prior to privatization to minimize 
the tension between economic efficiency and equity if privatization is considered an option. 
On the other hand, public opposition to rebalancing the tariffs in some developing countries 
underlines the need to design pricing policies that balances economic efficiency and social 
equity objectives. 
In some developing countries, reforms have led to improved operational efficiency by 
minimizing energy losses and increasing capacity availability. For example, the liberalized 
market model in South America has been relatively successful in attracting investments in 
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generation than the dominant single-buyer model in South Asia (Millan, 2005). Reforms 
(mainly privatization and regulation) seem to have improved cost efficiency of utilities in 
many developing countries. In that sense, reforms seem to have fulfilled one of their major 
objectives. However, as mentioned, the gains have not trickled down to consumers. Evidence 
also suggests that consumers benefited from efficiency gains from privatization in the 
presence of effective regulation. Experience suggest the need to create an independent and 
competent regulatory body before privatization of electricity utilities. 
The adoption of reforms in Latin America was accompanied with an expansion in rural 
electricity access programs as opposed to countries in South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa 
where the lack of access to in rural areas remains a problem (Barnes, 2007). In contrast, 
South Africa achieved higher electrification without implementing the textbook reform 
model. Evidence suggests that, in the absence of other complementary socio-economic 
arrangements, reforms alone cannot significantly increase access to electricity in developing 
countries. The existence of subsidies for rural electrification programs has revealed the limits 
of the market based reforms to improve access to energy to the rural population. 
Electricity theft remains a common problem in urban areas of many developing and transition 
countries despite the reforms. This implies that establishing social legitimacy of reforms is 
crucial in tackling the prevalent problems of non-technical energy losses (energy theft) and 
non-payment in developing countries. One way to increase the public acceptance of reforms 
and related policies by improving reliability of service, local engagement, and better 
communication with users. 
As mentioned, pricing reform is a central part of electricity reforms. The studies of the price 
effects of reforms cover a range of different countries. However, despite their importance, 
these do not constitute a substantial literature. Many of these are multi-county studies which 
are difficult to conduct credibly due to the many differences such as the presence of various 
taxes and subsidies and currency exchange rate fluctuations. A measurement strategy in some 
studies has been to use the price ratios for different types of consumers. However, while the 
price studies may reveal trends and price changes among countries, they are of limited use for 
assessing reform performance in individual countries. Moreover, studies of price effects are 
primarily focused on the lower and middle income developing countries while studies of the 
poorest countries such as Eberhard et al. (2011) are scarce although this also reflects less 
reform activities in these countries. 
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There is a substantial and growing body of literature based on the efficiency and productivity 
techniques. Some of these also include some measures of quality and reliability of service in 
their models. The initiation of the reforms coincided with a period of strong methodological 
development and growing interest in the application of these techniques to empirical studies 
of network industries and in particular the electricity reforms. In the same period, some 
regulators adopted these techniques as practical tools for benchmarking of regulated utilities 
as part of their efforts to implement incentive-based regulation to promote cost efficiency in 
the natural monopoly networks. It is no coincidence that most efficiency and productivity 
studies of the sector are focused on the performance of electricity distribution utilities. The 
application of the techniques to sector-wide efficiency and productivity analysis have been, 
however, more difficult and, as a result, less common likely due to the unbundled structure of 
post reform sectors. 
 
4.3. Macroeconomic and Welfare Lessons from the Literature 
Reforms should ultimately improve human development and contribute to reduction in 
income inequalities. Reform success is often gauged against improved macroeconomic 
development and benefits to low-income groups through increased access, improved service, 
and affordable prices. The linkage between reforms and the poor is thus gaining attention 
considering the direct and indirect effects of reforms to the welfare of low income 
households. Our survey of the macroeconomic effects of reforms revealed only a limited 
number of studies based on cost benefit analysis, economic growth, and poverty alleviation. 
These studies are quite small in relation to the overall volume of the reform literature and are 
not of recent dates. This is somewhat unexpected as these topics constitute important 
motivations for reforms and aspects of their outcomes. 
Few studies have used the CGE modelling approach. However, as with the reform and 
economic growth literature establishing causal effects between sector level reforms and its 
economy wide effects is inherently difficult. Cost benefit studies seem more suited for this 
task. The impact of reforms on economic growth is expected to be positive (Kirkpatrick, 
2014). This is not surprising when macroeconomic conditions have catapulted energy reforms 
in many developing countries. Privatization, if pursued with economic motives, seems to be 
conducive in macroeconomic terms. However, removal of subsidies seems to generate 
contractionary economic effects in the short-run although the long-term effects are positive 
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(IMF, 2013). Hence, reform and rebalancing of energy subsidies in developing countries 
should be appropriately phased, well-targeted and transparent while the price increases 
should be sequential and not abrupt in order to support economic growth both in the short-
term and in the long run. 
Cost benefit analysis as an applied welfare economic tool is commonly used in most manners 
of policy analysis. However, we find that very few such studies have attempted to assess the 
performance of the reforms. Cost benefit analysis of policies often requires developing 
counterfactual scenarios of how the sector would have evolved without the reforms (see, 
Galal et al., 1994). Clearly, the counterfactuals would require some strong and limiting 
assumptions that would make the results of such studies uncertain. It is still surprising that so 
few studies exist while a cost benefit analysis of reforms in developing countries has 
important welfare motivations and effects. 
Reforms can potentially enhance economic welfare as documented from the lessons of 
experience. However, reforms alone are incapable of creating an equitable distribution of 
welfare among different income groups. The welfare gains from privatization have mostly 
benefitted the domestic and foreign-owned producers. As indicated earlier, effective 
regulation increases the welfare gains for consumers. The importance of the regulatory 
framework in maintaining a balance between efficiency and equity considerations is 
paramount in developing countries. 
Some poverty related reform studies are multi-country analysis. The insights gained by these 
have therefore limited relevance for the outcomes observed in individual countries. Also, the 
link between the reforms and poverty reduction is complex and difficult to quantify. 
However, evidence suggests the presence of a correlation between access to electricity and 
economic development (Sovacool, 2013). Better access to electricity in rural Bangladesh has 
increased the economic welfare of the poor and helped reduce poverty. This implies that 
reforms can aim at catering the electricity to the poor as part of efforts to reduce poverty. This 
is also a major challenge considering the costs involved. For example, the investment 
requirements for providing electricity to Sub-Saharan Africa over a 10-year period is 
estimated between 160 and 215 billion $U.S. (Rosnes and Vennemo, 2012). Innovative 
market and incentive based models can improve the cost effectiveness of achieving access-
enhancing targets. 
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4.4. Current State of the Literature 
The empirical literature on the impacts of reforms represents a sizable research on this topic 
across both developing and transition economies. Most studies of reforms have analysed one 
or more of market structure, technical efficiency (e.g., reliability, environmental footprints), 
economic efficiency (e.g., reduction in supply costs and resulted electricity prices), impact of 
the reforms on broad economic variables (e.g., economic growth, social welfare). Latin 
America has received comparatively more studies for two reasons: (i) the region is among the 
pioneers of market-driven electricity reforms and (ii) the availability of data facilitating 
quantitative analysis of these reforms. 
Overall, the evidence on the performance of reforms in developing countries remains mixed 
for varied reasons. The results indicate that reforms have not achieved the stated objectives in 
most countries. Moreover, the reform measures in the samples or case studies may be 
inadequate to identify significant effects using quantitative (mostly econometric) analysis. 
For example, adequate data is often not available to econometrically assess the impact of 
reforms on system reliability and service quality. 
Electricity reform and performance data tend to suffer from endogeneity and simultaneity 
bias. Establishing the effects of reforms typically involve controlling for country or utility 
specific factors. This is because reforms are multi-dimensional and involve a number of 
simultaneous inter-related steps affected by a vector of political, economic and institutional 
factors that are difficult to quantify. These factors make it difficult to isolate the effects of 
specific reform steps or interactions among them on specific reform outcomes. However, 
econometric studies using similar methodologies and a narrow set of variables in different 
time periods have limited potential to make substantial contributions to the literature. 
The main remaining challenges concern finding innovative ways to improve electrification, 
develop institutional capabilities, and align the reforms with sustainability objectives. The 
objectives of reforms are also undergoing a significant reorientation brought on by global 
efforts to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and combat climate change. The electricity sector 
accounts for the largest share of total emissions from the energy sector and driven by 
increases in developing economies, estimated at 40% (IEA, 2014). The debate in developing 
economies is therefore increasingly about how markets can deliver on emissions reduction 
targets and greener economic growth. Nonetheless, the emergence of market-based reforms 
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and renewable energy technologies has created opportunities to jointly achieve the access and 
sustainably objectives. 
The reallocation of subsidies towards the renewables and reducing fossil fuel subsidies given 
that they are poorly targeted and bear large environmental costs is increasingly an option. 
Future research should build on the existing knowledge to address the new challenges facing 
the sector and reforms. Recent studies such as Carvalho et al. (2016) and Sen et al. (2016) 
have started the empirical debate. However, designing all-encompassing reforms capable of 
dynamically balancing economic efficiency, welfare (human and economic well-being) of the 
poor, and affordable energy in developing and transition economies remains arguably the 
main strategic challenge facing the reforms. 
 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
 
This paper reviewed the literature on the linkages between electricity reforms; economic and 
technical efficiency, operational performance, economic growth, economic welfare and 
poverty reduction in developing countries. This was conducted in the context and motivation 
of energy reforms, reviewing the progress and assessing the factors that shaped the outcomes 
of reforms, measuring reform performance, exploring the theory and practice of electricity 
reforms and critically formulating policy lessons based on the performance of reforms in 
developing countries. The extent of reforms varies across the developing countries in terms of 
changes in market structures, the role of the state and the regulation of the sector. 
The literature suggests that assessments reforms have mainly focussed on measuring their 
operational and economic efficiency and productivity impacts. However, the literature on the 
macro linkages of the reforms is scarce. Also, research on the impact of reforms on the poor 
remains limited. Hence, examining the impact of reforms on factors directly affecting the 
poor needs to be among future topics for research. Moreover, the incompleteness of reforms 
and the interplay of economic, political and institutional compounds the challenge of properly 
measuring the impacts of individual reform steps. 
Reforms have improved the efficiency and productivity in the sector, although the efficiency 
gains have not always reached the consumers. The establishment of effective independent 
regulation is necessary for the transfer of efficiency gains to the customers and ensure that 
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not only producers and the government benefit from privatization. Reforms can help poverty 
alleviation when the poor have access to electricity. This implies that reforms should be 
localized with a view to meet the electricity needs of the poor. There is also consensus in the 
literature that the regulatory framework is crucial for balancing the tension between economic 
efficiency and equity impacts of reforms. 
We found several caveats in the literature, which future research can address. Cost-benefit 
analysis of reforms remains limited. The impact of reforms on electricity network 
investments, reliability, and cost effectiveness are unclear and under-studied. Competition in 
the wholesale markets and diagnosis and mitigation of market power in developing countries 
also need to be studied in the aftermath of reforms although it is desirable to deal with market 
power structurally ex ante. The empirical literature focuses mostly on the electricity sector. 
Similar studies should explore the impacts of reforms in other energy sectors and related 
liberalized network industries. 
Moreover, there is a large number of small systems in developing countries and these require 
reform models and solutions that differ from those of large systems. Also, the lack of 
institutional capacity and expertise tends to be exacerbated in small developing economies. 
However, the literature on reform in these sectors remains rather limited partly due to the fact 
that reforming these systems have been more difficult. 
Finally, research should address the emerging challenges facing the sector and reforms such 
as the reallocation of subsidies from fossil fuels towards the renewables. Also, reforms 
increasingly need to balance the need for competitive markets with intervention to 
accommodate renewables and climate change policies. Designing all-encompassing reforms 
capable of dynamically balancing economic efficiency, welfare (human and economic well-
being) of the poor, and affordable energy is arguably the main strategic challenge facing the 
reforms. Therefore, research also needs to evolve and consider multi-dimensional 
assessments of the reforms.  
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